Confusion Second

Relief Third, Hopefully

Large rocks hurtle towards our heads. What happens? We duck. The process, however, is complex.

It involves answering two questions: what is that? and how do I behave? This anthropomorphic perspective is backwards and flawed. It suggests searching (for what, that and how) and then behaving.

The whole process (what, that and how) can be instinctive, like ducking the rock: body-as-it-was, object, body-as-it-is.¹ Usually, the process is complex: We encounter conflict (confusion) and unfamiliarity (doubt).

We automatically (and largely unconsciously) inhibit the primed behavior and resolve the confusion and doubt. Resolution disinhibits and unleashes automatic action, much like a baseball player swinging at a pitch. In fact, a baseball player swings well before he is even aware he has swung or has chosen to swing.²

Outlining An Encounter

The details of an encounter with an emotionally salient object are body-based. The event and its resolution are expressed in the form: body-as-it-was, object, body-as-it-is. An emotion is simply the change in the body evoked by the object.

If the presence of an object exceed some threshold, our brain is triggered and pays attention. It creates a sensory-representation [s-rep] and contextual-representation [c-rep] of the object.

Chris Brewin et al. (2010), describing his dual memory model:³

Evidence from cognitive psychology and neuroscience implies distinct neural bases to abstract, flexible, contextualized representations (C-reps) and to inflexible, sensory-bound representations (S-reps)... [Our] model is used to explain how the different types of distressing visual intrusions associated with clinical disorders arise, in terms of the need for correct interaction between the neural systems supporting S-reps and C-reps.

To account for an s-rep, and a c-rep, I use a red triangle to represent an s-rep and a green triangle to represent a c-rep. Red suggests concern: unforeseen data viewed as a threat. Green suggests comfort: presumption substituted for genuine insight.

Together, these representations form our general understanding of an object. This understanding has three parts: c-rep unsupported by s-rep [red], s-rep unsupported by c-rep [green], and c-rep supported by s-rep [a more neutral color which reflects the relative strength of green and red].

Our general understanding reflects what we comprehend and what we apprehend. We comprehend data supported by context. Our comprehension usually reflects multiple core-understandings.

A core understanding is a familiar emotion which keys an understood behavior in response to the object. Favorable outcomes and positive affect typically arise from core understanding. However positive the outcome, we often first experience conflict among possible behaviors. Such conflict is central feature of our general understanding. Conflict evokes confusion.

What we don’t comprehend, we apprehend. Apprehension reflects two qualities of partial understanding: presumption (context unsupported by data) and observation (data unsupported by context).

Observation evokes anxiety. Presumption evokes assurance. Too much presumption causes denial, for example.

In general, we view unforeseen data as a threat. Because of this bias, our apprehensions evoke more anxiety than assurance. Apprehension evokes doubt. (Here, conflict, presumption, observation and apprehension describe attributes of the overlap of s- and c-reps. Confusion, anxiety, assurance and doubt are the emotions evoked by conflict, observation, presumption and apprehension.)

Our general understanding of an object does not evoke confusion, anxiety, curiosity and doubt. Rather, confusion, anxiety, curiosity and doubt are features of our general understanding.

At the very onset of an encounter, the emotionality can be quiet complex. When confusion and doubt exceed a threshold, our brain inhibits the primed behavior and seeks resolution.

Our brain resolves. Our body behaves. (An emotion is a body change, a behavior. When I use the word ‘behavior’ rather than ‘emotion,’ I intend to indicate a complex sequence of body changes. Colloquially, behaviors are complex, sequenced emotions.)

From general understanding comes behavior. This outcome reflects the combination of our dual memories (sensory and contextual), and our behavior-inhibition and -activation systems (BIS and BAS). A clear analytic framework for these memory systems and behavior systems shows how automatic the process is. It strips away the pathetic fallacy.

If events are things which happen to us, our behavior is driven by our own unique context - the combination of nature and nurture which catalogs possible behaviors. The more nuanced our context for a given event, the more our best-possible-behavior resembles the best-behavior-possible.

Context is essential to the efficiency and effectiveness of our behavior. Trauma causes damage to context. Any event which does not completely endorse the enacted behavior causes trauma - an opportunity for learning. Some trauma is so severe, it stifles the process of learning and rebuilding context.

Context, Trauma and Best-Behavior-Possible

Sensory representations are just that. Contextual representations are the applicable elements of our context. Contextual representations are assumptions. Together, s-reps and c-reps form a moment of remembered presence within our assumptive world. This statement characterizes individual moments of experience rather than some quality of the self.

Context is any quality of understanding: our innate tendencies, instincts and reflexes - our nature - and our somatic markers, biases, scripts, schemas, personalized mind-blindness, unchallengeable doubts and certainties, internal working models, and values - our nurture. Context is nothing less than our model of both the world and also how we most effectively respond to it.

Context is the means to efficiently identify the best-behavior-possible. Trauma is the means to creating best-behaviors-possible.

A defining quality of best-behavior-possible is that the event’s outcome unequivocally endorses the behavior. A lesser behavior, a best-possible-behavior, will give rise to an outcome which denigrates the enacted behavior, perhaps to the point of extinction.

Trauma violates context and impairs efficiency (here, context and efficiency are tautological). Trauma breaks down core understandings, increases apprehension and causes greater doubt. (In the case of heightened sensitivity to presumption, trauma might cause greater assurance - denials, confabulations, etc.)

As Tedeshi and Calhoun note: the "seismic" set of circumstances severely challenges, contradicts, or may even nullify the way the individual understands why things happen.⁴ As Brewin notes: trauma generally involves a violation of basic assumptions connected with survival as a member of a social group.⁵

We struggle with the consequences of a traumatic event. We seek to resolve lingering doubt. Most often, we adapt. We assemble a better sequence of emotions to create a closer approximation of best-behavior-possible. The school of hard rocks is the best teacher and is the primary source of nurture.

Tedeschi and Calhoun:⁶

Posttraumatic growth refers to a change in people that goes beyond an ability to resist and not be damaged by highly stressful circumstances; it involves a movement beyond pretrauma levels of a adaption. Posttraumatic growth, then, has a quality of transformation, or a qualitative change in functioning, unlike the apparently similar concepts of resilience, sense of coherence, optimism, and hardiness.

The struggle with trauma generates much of our learned (rather than innate) efficiency and effectiveness. If posttraumatic growth [PTG] involve “movement beyond pretrauma levels,” then we adapt, understand more clearly (efficiency) and behave more effectively. PTG creates comprehension.

General Understanding And Memory

Our general understanding is the composition of an s- and c-rep. The correspondence these representations gives rise to three distinct qualities. Observation is the experience of an s-rep without a consonant c-rep. Presumption is the experience of a c-rep unsupported by available sensory data. Core understanding is the combination of known information consonant with accurate context.

The degree of correspondence between an s-rep and c-rep indicates the degree of familiarity. An encounter with a well-explained, well-experienced object would be a routine experience, one with little unforeseen data or unsupported assumptions. (To overplay how, behavior based on routine experience is know-how).

An encounter with a little-explained, unexperienced object would be a novel experience, one with little core understanding. With less correspondence between s- and c-rep, the focus of attention is larger and more diffuse.

If an encounter with a novel object becomes a traumatic event, we would have memory of the s-rep and no need to retain a memory of the irrelevant c-rep. In fact, if trauma negates context, the specific contextual basis for a traumatic event’s c-rep might have been negated too. In these circumstances, negated c-reps would leave only s-reps - the elementary basis for potential intrusive images.

We can try to create a corresponding c-rep when we reexperience the s-rep of the traumatic event. This possibility is a quality of the dual system of memory. Brewin’s explanation seems to describe the lack of c-reps as a quality of the event:

According to dual representation theory, perception of a moderately stressful or emotionally salient event results in the creation of more enduring C-reps and S-reps. Such S-reps would also include autonomic markers of affective values such as fear or disgust. The S-rep can be reactivated bottom-up by experiencing a similar perceptual input or top-down via associations from the higher level representation of the original event.

Brewin extrapolates from his dual representation theory to explain intrusive imagery. A memory system which discards irrelevant or negated c-reps would carry his theory forward equally as well.

Core understanding can produce the best-possible-behavior. The less familiar an object, the less likely we will know the best-possible-behavior or be able to approximate one. The less familiar an object, the greater our apprehension and doubt.

One of the qualities of familiarity is that the core understanding dominates the general understanding. If an object is well understood, we might have multiple understandings, often in conflict. Conflict evokes confusion. The larger our core understanding, the greater the potential for conflict and confusion.

Together, core understandings and apprehensions characterize our general understanding of an object. If conflict and doubt exceed a certain threshold, we inhibit the primed best-behavior-possible rather than act reflexively.

We process, grow disinhibited then act. We do the best we can.

The consequences of an event endorse and degrade the various qualities of our general understanding. Our presumptions may have been accurate. We may have developed some understanding of unforeseen data. Some of our core understands may have proven less apt after the encounter.

We learn from the event. We improve our core understandings. As we gain insight, our behavior relies less on observation and presumption. The degree of s- and c-rep correspondence increases. We build know-how, and our best-possible-behavior approaches best-behavior-possible.

Cookies, Conflicts, Core Understandings

Core understanding (sensory information contained in a prefigured context) is the experience of an s-rep consonant with a c-rep. We know what behavior is best for that: we know how. This statement is critically different than saying we know what that is.

Context contains assumptions about the truth. In fact, those assumptions could declare opinion or presumption to be factual. Core understanding represents useful behaviors, not truthful facts. Facts embedded in context may improve the set of possible behaviors but can be irrelevant. How many ‘facts’ are needed to duck a rock?

The core understanding of most objects is composed of several understandings. If isolated, each understanding would generate a unique emotion. Together, they propose a variety of different behaviors. The conflict among this set of possible behaviors is usually the dominant feature of most objects.

Handling conflicts is integral to maximizing the outcome of the event. We have greater flexibility when we have nuanced understandings of an object. We know several things to consider and the routine behaviors appropriate to those considerations. We resolve the conflict and enact the behavior judged closest to best-possible.

If an event is completely routine - fresh baked cookies on the kitchen counter - we can be familiar with several aspects of the object - our core understandings. Each is associated with a routine behavior. The cookie is a) yummy b) fattening and c) likely to belong to someone else. Accordingly, we might a) eat it, b) avoid it or c) ask if we can have it. Which behavior is best?

General Understanding, Lateralization and Neural Liminality

One significant attribute of lateralization is the distinction between sensory representations and memory (right-brain) and contextual representations and memory (left-brain). The literature makes many additional attributions to lateralization - affect, motivation, dominance, trait-level characterizations, etc. These attributions can be explained, at least in part, by lateral-qualities of the s- and c-memories.

We live in a remembered present. As we resolve one event, we lose fixation on the formally emotionally-salient object. Our perception becomes more sensitive to unassociated data.

An object appears. We take in sensory data - a right-brain activity. We access our declarative memory - facts associated with the data - a left-brain activity. Nothing is yet emotionally salient but the neurons are firing away. We might as well be staring at a wall.

The magnitude of right- and left-brain neural activity indicates the degree of arousal. The next step makes me want to create a new term - neural liminality. If the degree of arousal is above some threshold - if it is neurally liminal - the object is emotionally salient.

When an object is neurally liminal, we automatically create a sensory-representation [s-rep] and a contextual-representation [c-rep]. In other words, our brain is triggered, pays attention and composes a general understanding of the object (which includes confusion, anxiety and assurance).

Sensitive and Biased

We have different sensitives to the s- and c-reps. We are vigilant to the qualities of s-rep and assured to the qualities of a c-rep. Anxiety and assurance are not opposite ends of one scale. Instead, they characterize distinct sensitivities to the s- and c-reps.

For a given s-rep, different people will experience different levels of anxiety. For a given c-rep, different people will experience different levels of assurance. These sensitivities are be trait-level biases (or might reflect brain damage).

When we have little sensitive to a sensory-rep, our right brain would show limited arousal. An object would appear to have few distinguishing features. The lack of description can impair our ability to make decisions. We fail to act, or at least operate without efficiency or accuracy. Alternatively, with high arousal comes high lability.

When we have little sensitivity to a contextual-rep, our left brain would show limited arousal. An object would appear to have little relevance. Given lack of context, an object would provoke only stereotypical behavior. Alternatively, with high arousal comes great confidence, with overly elaborate, overly controlling behaviors.

I color s-reps as red - right-brained, anxiety, and potentially panic - and c-reps as green - left-brained, assurance, and potentially disregard. In a sense, red indicates ‘stop’ and green ‘go,’ (a pathetically fallacious sense?)

As long as we can regulate panic and disregard when we encounter a potentially threatening object, we continue to resolve the confusion and doubt evoked by our general understanding. We remained primed to act, and simulate possible behaviors in order to assemble one which more closely approximates best-behavior-possible.

If we cannot regulate, we either panic, fleeing a potential opportunity, or take charge, disregarding a potential threat. Look before you leap. Nothing ventured, nothing gained.

Left-brained people - those with heightened sensitivity to c-reps - approach with (over-) confidence and might be biased to mania. Right-brained people - those with heightened sensitivity to c-reps - quickly withdraw and might be biased to depression.

The qualities of the representational systems (sensory memory and contextual memory), which gives rise to an emotion, bias the entire system of behavior and its regulation. We have trait-level predispositions which might include:

• the rapidity of creating s- and c-reps,
• the threshold for right- and left-brain arousal (which could be similar or not),
• the sensitive to right- and left-brain arousal (which could be similar or not),
• the sensitivity to conflict and confusion, and
• the reactivity to apprehension and doubt.

Innate responsiveness, thresholds and sensitivities could explain how neural representations of an object induce emotions. It would appear as a bottoms up process rather than one directed by higher-order cognitive processes.

Accompanied by the pathetic fallacy, we would describe events in terms of inhibition, search, behavior activation and so on, as if these are things our selves do. Pathetic fallacy aside, conscious awareness of an event is more symptomatic of process than causal. Said differently, in many cases, conscious awareness is the consequence of process, particularly of traumatic experience.

Large rocks hurtle towards our heads. What happens?

Sensory data would include size and speed. We have predictive perception. In other words, our brains automatically contextualized the data, using our intuitive physics (innate context). Our spacial sense (innate context) and predictive perception indicates the object will strike our head.

The combination of the sensory data, our innate physics and spacial sense, and whatever learning we have form two representations. Before these two representations resolve into a general understanding, they would still give rise to basic affective qualities: anxiety evoked by observations of unforeseen data and assurance evoke by presumptions based on unsupported assumptions. We experience apprehension and doubt.

Anxiety and assurance are arousing. When the degree of arousal is great enough, the potential understanding is neurally liminal. At this threshold point, the s- and c-reps resolve into a general understanding. Comprehension emerges when data is contextualize. Comprehension replaces much of the uncharacterized apprehension.

Our general emotion of the hurtling rock would be fear. Because of the specificity of our innate context, we instinctively duck.

Inhibiting More Writing: A Conclusion

One the one hand, we have an object and an associated general understanding. For a complex object, we experience the confusion of conflict and the doubt of apprehension. A complex object has complex emotionality (a tautology).

On the other hand, we have trait-level predispositions to the s-rep and c-rep which compose a remembered present of the current event. We might overlook material details or find material details irrelevant. We might overreact to the unforeseen or act with too much presumptive assurance.

The soup of general understandings and predispositions evokes behavior. How do we go from many possible behaviors to just one? How do these outcomes often break down context? How do we grow from these traumatic events? How do we go from best-behavior-possible to best-possible-behavior?

I will examine how the emotionality evoked by our dual memories drives our behavior-inhibition and -activation systems in my next essay.